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Does an Administrator's General Interest in
Fulfilling Her Duties Meet the Constitution's
Requirements for Seeking Judicial Review of
a Decision She Doesn't Like?

SGlance

by Patrick C. McGinley

PatrickC. McGinley is professor
of law at the West Virginia
University College of Law, P.O. Box
6130, Morgantown, WV 26506;
(304) 293-6823.

Article III limits the
decisional authority of
federal courts to "cases
or controversies." If a
matter brought to federal
court does not involve a
case or controversy, the
person seeking review is
said to have no "standing" and the court is
obligated to dismiss the
matter. This case asks the
Supreme Court to decide
if an administrator here, the Director of the
United States Department
of Labor's Office of
Workers' Compensation
Programs - has standing
to seek review of an
administrative-law
decision with which the
administrator disagrees.

A party asserting that he or she has
standing in a case must establish:
1) an "injury in fact," i.e., a concrete or actual invasion of a legally
protected right; 2) a "fairly traceable" causal connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged action alleged to have caused
it; and 3) a fair likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130, 2136 (1992).

,

The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulties involved in
defining constitutional standing,
noting that the "constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition." Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
It is not surprising, then, that the
issue of standing to sue has been
one of the most contentious in the
field of administrative law.
Here, the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs
(the "Director") seeks judicial
review of what she believes is an
erroneous factual determination by
an administrative-law tribunal, the
Benefits Review Board (the
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"Board"). (The Board's decision with
which the Director disagrees denied
total disability benefits to an injured
worker covered by the Federal
Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S. §§
901-950 (1988) (the "LHWCA" or
the "Act"), even though the worker,
who was affected directly and
adversely by the Board's decision,
chose not to seek judicial review
despite his clear standing to do so.)
The Director appealed the Board's
decision to the Fourth Circuit. No
party to the appeal raised any question about the Director's standing to
seek review of the Board's denial of
total disability benefits.
A federal court, however, has the
authority and, indeed, the constitutional duty to ensure that the person
seeking its decision has the constitutional standing under Article III to
do so. Accordingly, a federal court
will raise the standing issue even if
the litigants do not. That is precisely
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what the Fourth Circuit did in this
case. The court proceeded to hold
that the Director had not suffered an
injury in fact as a result of the
Board's decision and, thus, did not
have standing to seek review of its
decision on the total-disability issue.
The Director, undaunted by the
turn of events in the Fourth Circuit,
sought review of the Fourth Circuit's
standing decision by filing a petition
for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court which was granted.
115 S. Ct. 41 (1994). Now, the
Court has the opportunity to clarify
the scope of the injury-in-fact
component of constitutional standing doctrine.

IISSUE
Does the Director of the United
States Department of Labor's Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs
have standing to obtain judicial
review of an administrative-law decision, when the injury in fact alleged
by the Director does not disrupt the
performance of her specific duties
and does not implicate her interest
in protecting the fiscal integrity of
certain funds she administers?
FACTS
Jackie Harcum, a worker covered by
the LHWCA, filed a compensation
claim under the Act for a back injury
sustained during his employment
with the Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company ("Newport
Shipbuilding"). The saga of his claim
provides the factual backdrop for
this case.
The LHWCA, under which Harcum
made his claim, was created as a
comprehensive scheme to compensate maritime workers injured or
killed while employed on the navigable waters of the United States.
Under the Act, an employer is liable,
up to a statutory maximum, for covered injuries or death without regard

to who was at fault. A maritime
employer also has certain duties to
provide medical services for any
covered employee.
Harcum worked as a machine
installer for Newport Shipbuilding
from 1963 until 1988. As noted, during the course of his employment,
Harcum experienced a series of back
injuries. The injury on which his
currently disputed workers' compensation claim is based occurred in
October 1984. While working on a
barge, Harcum was struck in the
lower back. In early 1985, Harcum's
physician twice performed surgery
to treat the herniated lumbar spinal
disc caused by the injury.
After a protracted recovery and several attempts by Harcum to return
to work, his doctor placed severe
restrictions on his ability to perform
even light-duty work at the shipyard.
On May 6, 1988, Newport
Shipbuilding caused Harcum to be
"passed out" of service, while
promising that it would attempt to
locate another job in its shipyard
that he could perform within his
physician's restrictions. In August
1988, Newport Shipbuilding
informed Harcum that it had no
shipyard work to offer him that was
compatible with his physical disability. In February 1989, after receiving
rehabilitation counseling provided
by Newport Shipbuilding, Harcum
secured a new five-dollar per hour
job that is comfortably within the
scope of work he can perform with
his existing disability.
In October 1989, Harcum filed for
compensation under the LHWCA.
The claim was referred to an
Administrative Law Judge (the
"AL") for a hearing to resolve several disputed factual issues, including
whether or not Harcum was entitled
to benefits for total, rather than partial, disability from the date he
stopped work at the shipyard -

May 6, 1988 - until the date he
found alternative employment February 16, 1989.
The ALJ ruled that Harcum was
entitled only to partial disability
benefits as of May 6, 1988.
According to the ALJ, Harcum had
regained residual wage-earning
capacity as of the May 1988 date
and, therefore, was entitled only
to a partial, rather than total
disability, award.
The Director appealed the AL's
ruling to the Board, contending
that Harcum was entitled to total
disability benefits from the date
of injury through February 1989
when he secured other employment. Harcum did not appeal but
did support the Director's decision
to do so.
The Board affirmed the ALJ, ruling
that Newport Shipbuilding's uncontradicted evidence showed that
there was suitable alternative
employment available to Harcum as
of May 6, 1988, the date of injury,
and that Harcum had failed to show
that he was unable to obtain other
employment. The Board also ruled
that a statement made to Harcum
by representatives of Newport
Shipbuilding to the effect that it
would attempt to find a light-duty
position for him and its hiring of a
vocational consultant to assist
Harcum in finding alternative
employment did not affect his
obligation to prove that he was
unable to find other employment.
The Board, thus, concluded that
Harcum was only partially disabled
as of May 1988.
The Director appealed to the
Fourth Circuit. Harcum did not
appeal but stated that the Director
could pursue the appeal as she
chose.

(Continued on page 154)
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The Fourth Circuit, as explained
above, raised the question of the
director's standing to appeal. The
court reasoned that Section 21(c) of
the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c)
(1988), which permits "any person
adversely affected or aggrieved by a
final order of the Board" to seek
judicial review of that order, "codifies the constitutional requirement
that limits standing to those persons
who can allege 'that they personally
have suffered or imminently will suffer an injury."' 8 F.3d 175, 180
(4th Cir. 1993).
The Fourth Circuit expressed its
view that the Director has standing
to seek judicial review of a Board
decision only if the decision "sufficiently implicates an administrative
or economic interest of the Director
so as to give rise to a redressable
injury." 8 F.3d at 181. Finding that
neither interest had been affected by
the Board's decision relating to the
total or partial nature of Harcum's
disability, the appellate court held
that the Director had not suffered an
injury in fact that gave her standing
to appeal the Board's decision.
CASE ANALYSIS
At the core of the Director's argument is her contention that standing
to seek judicial review of Board
decisions is not limited to injuries
that directly affect her pecuniary
interest in managing agency funds or
that disrupt a specific administrative
function. The Director contends
that there is a split in the federal
courts of appeals regarding this
issue.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's
narrow view of standing, she contends that Congress' grant of broad
administrative and enforcement
responsibilities to the Director gives
her a significant stake in the correct
interpretation of the LHWCA by the
Board and in the Act's consistent
application. She argues that any
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adverse effect a Board decision has
on these substantive interests of the
Director means that the Director has
sustained an injury in fact that satisfies the Constitution's Article III
standing requirements.
The Director observes that Congress
authorized the Director to participate in any appeal of a Board decision to a federal court of appeals by
I providing for the appointment of
attorneys to represent the Director.
33 U.S.C. § 921a (1988). The
Director argues that Congress did
not indicate an intent to limit the
Director's appellate participation
only to issues that directly affect her
pecuniary interest or that disrupt a
specific administrative function. On
i the contrary, the Director asserts
that Congress' imposition of such a
wide variety of legal duties gives her
a significant stake in the substantive
outcome of claim adjudications and,
thus, Congress must have intended
that the Director have standing to
seek judicial review of substantive
legal and factual issues arising from
the Board's resolution of disputed
claims.
The Director argues that by charging
her with the responsibility for
administering and enforcing a compensation system akin to a public
social insurance program, Congress
gave the Director a material interest
in ensuring that the Act is construed
and applied in a manner consistent
with its intent in enacting the
LHWCA. Also relevant on this point
is the fact that the Director has been
instructed by Congress to assist
claimants directly in the claimadjudication process.
The Director also asserts that erroneous Board rulings impair the
Director's efficient administration of
the LHWCA by undermining her
authority to resolve compensation
disputes without recourse to formal
administrative-law hearings. Thus,

she asserts, precluding her from
appealing the Board's claim-adjudication decisions would reduce
employer incentives to view the
Director's informal resolution
process as authoritative because an
employer could proceed to a higher
level of review from which the
Director could not appeal. Moreover,
the Director further asserts that if
her ability to seek judicial review of
legally or factually incorrect Board
decisions were blocked, important
policy differences between the
Director and the Board would be
perpetuated without a forum for
resolution.
I The Director next argues that limit-

ing standing only to issues that
directly affect her pecuniary interest
or that disrupt a specific administrative function would lead to a caseby-case judicial inquiry regarding
what constitutes injury to a specific
administrative function, thereby
injecting additional uncertainty and
inefficiency into the claim-adjudication process.
Consistent with this expansive view
of the Director's standing are the regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor that interpret the
Act as granting the Director standing
to participate in all stages of the
claim-adjudication process, including seeking judicial review of Board
decisions in the federal appeals
courts. 20 C.F.R. § 802.410 (a). The
Director contends that the
Secretary's interpretation of the Act
is entitled to judicial deference.
Finally, the Director contends that
the history of the LHWCA confirms
Congress' intention to confer standing to seek judicial review of Board
rulings. In particular, the Director
points to the legislative history of the
Black Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA")
which generally incorporates the
procedures of the LHWCA. The
Director emphasizes that, when the

Issue No. 4

BLBA was passed in 1977, the
Senate Committee that drafted the
statute specifically addressed the
issue of the standing of the Director
to appeal erroneous Board decisions
under both the LHWCA and the
BLBA. The Committee stated in its
report that it was Congress' intent to
afford the Director the right to participate in the adjudication of both
BLBA and LHWCA claims before
ALJs, the Board, and appropriate
federal courts.
At the outset, Newport Shipbuilding
asserts that no conflict between the
federal circuit courts of appeals
exists regarding the standing of the
Director to seek judicial review of
Board decisions when the claimant
does not participate in the appeal.
Newport Shipbuilding points to decisions of the Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits, all holding that the
Director does not have standing
under Section 21(c) of the Act to
seek judicial review of a Board decision unless her pecuniary or specifically designated administrative
interests are adversely affected. See
Fusco v. PeriniNorth River Assocs.,
601 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1979);
Director,OWCP v. Donzi Marine,
Inc., 586 F.2d 377 (5th Circ. 1978).
Newport Shipbuilding contends that
language to the contrary in decisions
of other circuits is merely dicta,
i.e., not necessary to the holding in
the case.
Newport Shipbuilding concedes that
the Court has not addressed the
scope of the Director's standing to
seek judicial review of Board decisions. It observes, however, that
while Section 21(c) gives the
Director the statutory authority to
seek judicial review of Board rulings,
the Court has suggested that the
Director must still satisfy the injuryin-fact element of Article III's caseor-controversy standing requirement. Director,OWCP v. Perini
North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297
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(1983). The Court in Perini noted
that "she may not have Article III
standing to argue the merits of [the
claim] because the Director's presence does not guarantee the existence of a justiciable controversy"
with respect to the scope of the
claimant's coverage under the
LHWCA. 459 U.S. at 304.
Harcum's failure to appeal the
Board's adverse ruling is heavily
relied on by Newport Shipbuilding
to support its argument that only
Harcum, not the Director, suffered
an injury in fact. While Harcum
obviously had standing to appeal the
Board's decision, he expressly
declined to participate in any review
proceeding. According to Newport
Shipbuilding, it is the claimant's
presence in any appeal of a Board
decision that creates an injury in
fact for purposes of Article III standing. Conversely, asserts Newport
Shipbuilding, the absence of a
claimant removes any injury in fact
that could establish Article III standing. The presence of the Director
adds nothing to the calculus necessary to create standing for purposes
of Article III.
Newport Shipbuilding asserts, as did
the Fourth Circuit, that the LHWCA
codifies the constitutional requirement that limits standing to those
persons who can allege "that they
personally have suffered or imminently will suffer an injury." 8 F.3d
175, 180. Here, neither the
Director's pecuniary interest nor her
legitimate administrative interests
are implicated by the Board decision
she is trying to challenge on appeal.

According to Newport Shipbuilding,
the Director claims an interest only
in the Board's construction of the
LHWCA's requirements for a determination of partial disability and
that interest simply has not been in
the past and is not now enough to
confer standing to appeal.
SIGNIFIC±AkNCE
The significance of this case is
related to whether or not the Court
has an interest in attempting to
clarify its standing jurisprudence
which critics have often found conflicting and confusing. Thus, the
Court could take an expansive view
of injury in fact and affirm the liberal standing principles it enunciated in its 1970s standing cases. If so,
the Court could hold that the
Board's decision caused the
Director to sustain an injury in fact
to her broad interest in the proper
enforcement of the Act and, accordingly, would reverse the Fourth
Circuit.
In contrast, the Court could take a
more restrictive approach to construing the constitutional injury-infact requirement. If so, the Court
would be continuing the trend of its
recent decisions which have constricted the scope of standing, a
course that limits access to federal
courts as a forum for resolution of
legal disputes.

(Continued on page 156)

Finally, Newport Shipbuilding argues
that in this case the Board's determination of when partial disability
commences under the Act does not
alter the Director's ability to carry
out her responsibilities under the
LHWCA or to protect the fiscal
integrity of any special fund.
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ARGUMENTS
For the Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, United
States Department of Labor
(Counsel of Record: Drew S. Days,
III, Solicitor General; Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20530
(202) 514-2217):
1. The Director's standing to seek
judicial review of decisions of the
Benefits Review Board is not limited
to decisions that affect her pecuniary interest or disrupt her performance of specific administrative
functions.
2. The history, text, and structure
of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act indicate
a congressional intent to give the
Director a stake in claim adjudications and to vest her with standing
to seek judicial review of erroneous
Board decisions.
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For Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company (Counsel
of Record: Lawrence P. Postol;
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson; 815 Connecticut Avenue,
NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC
20006; (202) 463-2400):
1. The alleged general injury to the
Director's broad interest in the
administering and enforcing the
Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act is not sufficient to
satisfy the injury-in-fact element of
Article III's case-or-controversy
requirement.
2. The Benefits Review Board's
decision did not affect the Director's
pecuniary interest or disrupt her
performance of specific administrative functions and, therefore, she did
not suffer an injury in fact sufficient
to satisfy constitutional standing
criteria.

Issue No. 4

